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1 .  Introduction: Necessary Conditions 
The main clauses in ( 1 )  and (2) are understood as stating necessary conditions for 
achieving the goals expressed in the if-clauses ( 1 )  and in the rationale-clauses (2). 
( 1 )  Anankastic conditionals 
a. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train. [Sreb9> 2001] 
b. I f  you want to become mayor, you have to go to the pub regularly. 
[Kratzer 1981] 
c. If you want to be healthy, you should drink more tea. 
d. If you want to dance professionally, you need to practice every day. 
(2) Corresponding rationale clauses 
a. You must take the A train in order to go to Harlem. [StrayhorniSreb9>] 
b. You have to go to the pub regularly in order to become mayor. 
c. You have to drink tea to be healthy. 
d. Y ou need to practice every day to dance professionally. 
Sentences l ike ( 1 ) , which have been called Anankastic (from the Greek word for 
necessity) , have the outward form of conditionals. But their meanings differ from 
those of ordinary indicative conditionals in interesting respects- apart from the 
curious fact that the if-clause can be replaced by an infinitival rationale-clause. I t  
i s  odd, for example, for a conditional sentence like ( l a) to imply (3) .  Why would 
a sentence of the form (4a) mean the same thing as one of the form (4b)? 
(3) I f  you do not take the A train, you will not go to Harlem . 
(4) a. [if . . .  want to p, then must q] = b. [i/not q. then not p] 
Ordinary indicative conditionals do not have this property. Compare the 
Anankastic conditional (5a) with the superficial ly similar (5b). This pair from 
Sreb0 (200 1 )  i s  modeled after an observation by Hare ( 1963) .  While (5a) is  
equivalent to (6a), (5b) does not mean the same thing as (6b). 
(5) a. If you want to be owner of America, you need to find the golden helmet. 
b. If you want to be owner of America, you need to see a psychiatrist. 
(6) a. If you do not find the helmet, you cannot be the owner of America. 
b. #lfyou do not see a psychiatrist, you cannot be the owner of America. 
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Several recent papers have addressed the problem of  Anankastic conditionals, 
seeking to show how their meanings can be explained by the same theory that has 
been successful in characterizing the meanings of other conditionals ( that of 
Kratzer 198 1 ,  1 99 1 ) .  In this paper, I will discuss a set of facts that challenge these 
recent attempts. Alongside of the 'necessity conditionals '  that have been the focus 
of attention, sits another class that might be cal led 'sufficiency conditionals ' ­
with possibility modals in place of the necessity modals: 
(7) Sufficiency conditionals? 
a. If you want to go to Harlem, you can take the A train.  
b. I f  you want to become mayor, you could go to the pub regularly. 
c. If you want to be healthy, you could drink more tea. 
d. I f  you want a decent grade, you can write a really  good paper. 
Like Anankastics, the sentences in (7) can be paraphrased with rationale clauses: 
(8) a. You can take the A Train in order to go to Harlem. 
b.  You could go to the pub regularly in order to become mayor. 
c. Y ou could drink tea to be healthy. 
d .  You can write a really  good paper to get a decent grade. 
In all of these sentences, the "consequent" provides a sufficient condition for 
achieving the desire expressed in  the if-clause/rationale clause. Both (7a) and (8a) 
assert that 'taking the A train is one of the ways you could get to Harlem '. And 
they both imply (9), suggesting an odd equivalence ( 10) parallel to (4), the 
equivalence that holds for Anankastics with universal modals. !  
(9) I f  you take the A Train, you (wil l)  get to Harlem. 
( 1 0) a. [if . . •  want to p. then can q] = b. [if q. then p] 
Thus, these sentences seem to be in relevant respects the 'existential'  versions of 
A nankastics. We might as well designate them 'Eparkastic Conditionals '  (from 
the Greek for 'sufficiency') .  
My goals in this paper are to summarize current approaches to the 
semantics of anankastics (section 3) , then to show why examples like (7)-(8) 
challenge those approaches (section 4) . To foreshadow, I will try to show that the 
current theories, while making correct predictions about the meanings of (7)-(8), 
also predict wrongly that ( 1 1 ) could be true in a world much like the real one. 
( 1 1) #If you want to go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. 
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I will then suggest a way to address the problem (section 5) . The idea is based on 
the observation that rationale clauses appear in non-modal environments ( 12a) , 
where they are understood as expressing something about the goal that is related 
to an agent's action. Thus ( 1 2b) is nonsensical , if Varitek is rational . 
( 1 2) a. Varitek took the A Train to go to Harlem. 
b. #Varitek kissed Pedro Martinez to go to Harlem. 
Appropriating an idea of von Fintel & Iatridou (2004) , I ' l l  suggest that anankastic 
(and eparkastic) sentences embed (sometimes ell iptical) purposive rationale 
clauses, but in the scope of the modal operator (as in 13) .  I wil l  argue that if this i s  
correct, the deviance of ( 1 1 ) follows from the deviance o f  ( 1 2b). 
( 13)  a .  If  you want to go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez (to go there) 
b. [CAN if you want to go to Harlem] [you kiss PM (to go there)] 
2. Kratzer' s  Theory of Modals and Conditional s 
2.1. Basic Ingredients of Moda[ Sentences 
To see the problem posed by Anankastic sentences and understand recent 
attempts to address it, it is necessary to introduce some background. All the recent 
work on anankastics start with Kratzer's ( 198 1 ,  1 99 1 )  theory of modals and 
conditionals in terms of restricted quantification over possible worlds. 
Under Kratzer's theory, modal sentences are interpreted with respect to 
two contextual parameters, each one a set of propositions (typically implicit) in 
the conversational background. The first set of propositions i s  a modal base, 
which formally  is given by a function f that assigns to the world of evaluation w 
the setf(w), propositions that express relevant facts about w and jointly  determine 
the worlds that the modal operator quantifies over. These could be propositions 
that are known to hold in the evaluation world, for instance, giving an epistemic 
modal base, or propositions that express relevant facts about the evaluation world, 
giving what Kratzer calls a circumstantial modal base. (The sentences considered 
in this paper chiefly involve modals restricted by circumstantial bases. )  
The second contextual parameter is an ordering source- a  set of 
propositions that serves to order the worlds described by the modal base 
according to how closely they conform to a set of ideals in the conversational 
background. The ordering source is modeled as the set of propositions g(w), 
which could express what the laws of w demand (a deontic ordering source) , or 
what our desires, aims, or goals are in w (a bouletic ordering) . These propositions 
partition the worlds in the modal base, determining a strict partial order on them 
( l4- version from von Fintel and I atridou 2005). And based on that ordering, it is 
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possible to select a subset of modal base worlds that are the best possible ones 
according to the ideals expressed in the ordering source ( 1 5). 
( 14) For any set of propositions P, we define a strict partial order <p: 
Vw',w" :  [w' <pw "  iff Vp EP [w
" Ep -7 w' Ep] and 3pEP [w'Ep A w"�p]] 
( 1 5) For a given strict partial order <p on worlds, we define the selection 
function MAXp that selects the set of <p-best worlds from any set X of 
worlds: Vx C;;; W: MAXp(x) = {w E x:  � 3w '  E x:  w'<pw '} 
Thus to derive truth conditions for sentences like ( 16) ,  modal operators l ike must, 
can, and the l ike,  take two sets of propositions as arguments before applying to 
the VP: a modal base .f(w) and an ordering source g(w), as in ( 17). 
( 1 6) I must move my car. 
( 17) II [must .f(w) g(w)] [vp I move my car] W·w = Vw' E MAxg(wln/(w» : I 
move my car in w'. 
"All of the worlds in the modal base that are as good as possible according 
to the ordering source are such that I move my car. " 
a. The circumstantial modal base .f(w) is the set of propositions that 
express relevant facts about w, such as: 
i .  My car is parked in front of my apartment. 
i i .  It is the early afternoon. 
b. The deontic ordering source g(w) is the set of propositions that express 
what the laws of w demand, including: 
I .  No car i s  parked in front of my apartment after 1 p.m.  
i i .  People who park cars in front of my apartment after 1 :00 pay a fine. 
2.2. Conditionals: I f-Clauses Restrict the Modal Base 
Adopting Lewis ' s  ( 1975) idea that if-c1auses can restrict adverbial quantifiers, 
Kratzer proposed that if-clauses in conditional sentences serve as an additional 
restriction on the modal base of a (possibly covert) modal operator. 
( 1 8) I f  i t' s  2 o'clock, I have to pay a fine. 
( 1 9) Conditionals 
a. ' I f  p. then must q' is true in w iff Vw' E MAxg(w)(n/+(w» : q(w') = 1 ,  
where J+- (w) =/(w) U p. 
b. ' I f  p then can q' is true in w iff 3w' E MAxg(w)(n/+ (w» : q(w ') = 1 ,  
whereJ+-(w) = .f(w) U p. 
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Now, in addition to the modal base propositions ( 17a) , which restrict the modal in 
terms of certain facts that are true in the evaluation world, the if-clause in  ( 1 8) 
expresses a hypothetical fact about the worlds that are quantified over (but is not 
necessarily true in the evaluation world), namely that it 's two o 'clock. 
Among these further restricted worlds, there are no worlds that are ' ideal ' 
according to the ordering source ( 1 7b)- since ( 17b(i) is false in these worlds. 
But there remains a partition between worlds that are "as close as possible" to the 
ideal - those in which I pay a fine-and worlds that are farther from the ideal ( in 
which nei ther ( l7b(i» nor ( 1 7b(ii) holds) . 
(20) "All of the best possible worlds (according to ( 1 7b» in which the modal 
base propositions ( 17a) are true and in which it 's two o 'clock are such that 
I pay a fine. " 
3. Anankastic Conditional Sentences: A Survey of Approaches 
3 . 1 .  Why the 'Standard Kratzerian Approach ' Fails: The 'Mayor Problem ' 
Consider the sentence (2 1) ,  and suppose that all the propositions in (22a) and 
(22b) are true. 
(2 1 )  You must g o  to the pub regularly. 
(22) a. The world is such that you will become mayor only if you go to the 
pub regularly. 
b. i .  You want to become mayor. 
1 1 .  You want not to go to the pub regularly. 
Kratzer ( 198 1 )  described this  as "the horrible story of someone who wants 
something but rejects the necessary means leading to the fulfil lment of her 
. desires", and observed that her doubly relative theory of modals correctly predicts 
(2 1 )  to be interpreted as a false sentence under the circumstances. 
But Kratzer' s  theory makes a wrong prediction about the meanings of 
A nankastic sentences: (23) is  predicted to be false as wel l ,  wrongly. 
(23) I f you want to become mayor, you have to go to the pub regularly. 
Kratzer's theory adds the if-clause- the proposition that you want to become 
mayor- to the factual modal base (2 1a) .  I f  the ordering source is picking out the 
goals that you have in the actual world, it includes both of the desires expressed 
in (2 1 b).  But since there is no way for any of the modal base worlds to satisfy 
both proposi tions in the ordering source simultaneously, worlds in which one or 
the other goal is met are tied for first place. That is ,  (24) is wrong as a 
description of the meaning of (23). 
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(24) In aU of the best possible worlds (according to the two propositions in 
(2 1 b» among those jointly described by (2 1a) and the proposition that you 
want to become mayor, you go to the pub regularly. 
3.2. Stebrj) 's Insight: If-Clauses Change the Ordering Source 
Sreb!D (2001)  was the first to address Kratzer's Anankastic problem. His 
suggestion was that material from the ifclause can be added to the o rdering 
source, rather than adding the whole if-clause to the modal base. Specifically, he 
proposed that the complement of want can be treated as a hypothetical ideal , 
rather than the whole ifclause being treated as a hypothetical fact. 
3.3. Stebrj) 's Problem, and a Non-Compositional Fix 
But SrebJlj ' s  suggestion doesn' t  solve Kratzer' s  problem, as was pointed out by 
von Fintel & Iatridou (2004) and Penka et al . (2004). Merely adding a proposition 
to the ordering source won't  handle incompatible goals: we 'd still  end up with 
mayor-worlds and pub-worlds tied for first place. 
Penka et al . (2004) offered an alternative modeled in part on Sreb!D's  
insight: new material is added to the modal base (a  la Kratzer) - but j ust the 
complement of want, internal to the if-clause (a la Sreb!D) . 
(25) 
This proposal solves the incompatible goal problem by treating the goal expressed 
in the if-clause as a hypothetical fact-only worlds in which you become mayor 
are considered, in effect removing the other goal (not going to the pub) from the 
. ordering source. 
Penka et al . ' s  explanation succeeds (in this instance), but is non­
compositional (j ust like Sreb!D's  approach) : the top layer within the ifclause (the 
want predicate) has to be ignored. 
3.4. If You Want to Ignore Want: The Central Role of the To-Clause 
Von Fintel & Iatridou (2004; henceforth vF&I) propose a way to handle the non­
compositionality problem while still achieving the same net result as Penka et al . 
(namely to treat the if-clause goal as a hypothetical fact) . Specifically,  vF&I 
capital ize on SrebJlj's  observation that Anankastics can be paraphrased using 
infinitival rationale clauses (26a), and propose that teleological modals select the 
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rationale clause as an argument (26b,c). 2 This infinitival to-clause expresses what 
vF&I call the designated goal- a goal that effectively overrides competing goals 
in the ordering source, in virtue of restricting the modal base worlds to j ust those 
where the goal is achieved. 
(26) a. To become mayor, you have to (/shoulcf) go to the pub regularly. 
b. [SHOULD few) g(w) to become mayor] [you go to the pub regularly] 
c. (26b) is true in w iff all the g(w)-best worlds inf(w) where you become 
mayor are worlds where you go to the pub regularly. 
For anankastics with if-clauses, vF&I suggest that the infinitival is stil l  present, 
but elliptical : 
(27) If you want to become mayor, you should go to the pub (to become mayor 
Ito do that) / '" ______ ---.. 
(28) '([{want v. )(!o p) then should q' is true in w iff Vw'  EMAXg(w/nf(w) U p): 
q(w') = 1 .  
The if-clause can now restrict the modal base i n  the standard way; i ts contribution 
to the truth conditions will be minimal since the work was already done by the to­
clause.4 And, vF&I argue, the to-clause does the job compositional ly.s 
3.5. The Ruud van Nistelrooy Problem: Multiple Compatible Goals 
Huitink (2005a) points out a problem that the proposals on the table so far cannot 
handle. She observes that all the proposals are designed to deal with conflicting 
goals that are held in the evaluation world (like in Kratzer 's  mayor scenario) . But 
they fail whenever the ordering source includes mul tiple goals that do not 
conflict. She considers Sreb0's  paradigmatic sentence: 
(29) If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A Train. 
Suppose that you have two goals: to go to Harlem, and to kiss the Dutch soccer 
star Ruud van Nistelrooy. The world is such that the modal base assigns to it the 
propositions in (30) ;  the ordering source will consist of (3 1 ) .  
(30) Propositions included in the modal basef(w): 
a. Y ou ' re at Penn Station, deciding whether to get on the A train.  
b. Ruud van Nistelrooy is on the northbound A train. 
c .  I f  you get on the northbound A train, you can go to Harlem. 
(3 1 )  Propositions in the ordering source g(w) describing what you want in w: 
a. Y ou go to Harlem.  
b. You kiss Ruud van Nistelrooy. 
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Huitink points out that the analyses of Penka e t  al . and vF&I (which result in  the 
proposition in the scope of want in the ifc1ause being added to the modal base) 
predict (29) to be true, correctly- but they also predict (32) to be true ! 
(32) #If you want to go to Harlem, you have to (should) kiss Ruud van 
Nistelrooy. 
To see why, consider the structure of (32) under vF&I 's designated goal 
analysis6: 
(33) If you want to go to Harlem, you should kiss RvN (to go to Harlem) 
(34) a. Truth conditions (without the ifc1ause) : 
True iff all the g(w)-best worlds in ftw) where you �o to Harlem are 
such that you kiss Ruud van Nistelrooy. 
b. Truth condi tions (with the if-clause, essentially the same) :  
True iff all the g(w)-best worlds in  f(w) where you both want to go to 
Harlem and you �o to Harlem are such that you kiss RvN. 
In the actual world w, both the g(w) goals stated in (3 1 )  are attainable as long as 
you get on the A train. If so, unlike Kratzer' s mayor scenario, the set of g(w)-best 
worlds are such that both propositions hold. Hence the truth conditions stated in 
(34) are met. 
3.5. 1 .  Huitink 's Solution: 'Salient Goals ' 
Huitink's solution is to abandon Kratzer's assumption that the ordering source 
necessarily picks out all of the goals held in the evaluation world. I nstead, she 
proposes that the ifclause can serve to introduce a salient goal into the context­
in effect introducing a bouletic conversational background consisting solely of the 
if-c1ause goal . 
. .. . . . . _ .. _n.� � ...... __ ""' 
(35) ' I f  (\Y:-.�!:"'then must g' is true in w iff Vw'E (�{p}{nf(w»): q(w')= l .  
... -...  _-_ ...  
Under Huitink's proposal , the ordering source contains just one goal- the one 
expressed in the ifclause. As a resul t the Ruud van Nislelrooy sentence (32) is no 
longer predicted to be true. 
(36) Prediction about (32) : FALSE (a correct prediction) 
True iff, in all the best ( i . e. gO-lo-Harlem) worlds inf(w), you kiss Ruud. 
(37) Prediction about (29) : TRUE (also a correct prediction) 
True iff in al l the best (=go-lo�Harlem) worlds inf(w), you take the A train 
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3.6. Another Contender: vF&/,s Nested ModaLs AnaLysis 
Another theory that I think remains on the table was proposed by vF&I in  the 
same 2004 paper in which they proposed their 'designated goal ' analysis. 
Although they did not end up adopting this theory in the final analysis, I think i t  is 
worth mentioning because i t  not only overcomes Kratzer's mayor problem, i t  also 
successfully handles Huitink's Ruud van Nistelrooy problem. In  short, vF&1 
suggested that anankastic sentences have an extra (covert) modal operator, and 
that it  is thi s modal whose (epistemic) modal base the ifclause restricts. Thus, the 
structure of sentences like (23) and (32) would be: 
(38) [<MUSl> if you want to become mayor] [HAVE-TO you go to the pub . . .  ] 
(39) [<MUSl> if you want to go to Harlem) [HAVE-TO you kiss Ruud . . .  ] 
I f  this  is the structure of an anankastic, competing goals held in the actuaL worLd 
(such as 'not going to the pub') would be irrelevant for the interpretation of (3 8) . 
The ordering source for the embedded modal is supplied not by a function of the 
utterance world, but by the goal stated in the if-clause that restricts the higher 
modal . For exactly the same reason, non-competing goals held in the actual world 
would be irrelevant for the interpretation of (39). 
4. 'Existential ' Anankastics? 
Kissing Pedro Martinez: The ProbLem Posed by SUfficiency ConditionaLs 
Consider a scenario very similar to Huitink's Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario,  this 
one involving the former Red Sox pitching ace Pedro Martinez. Suppose in 
particular that Pedro Martinez is  on the northbound A train and that you 'd like to 
kiss him. In addition, you wouldn' t  mind going to Harlem. 
Nevertheless, (40a) and (40b) are false. 
(40) a. # If you want to get to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. 
b. # In order to get to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. 
Al l  of the proposals currently on the table fail to predict this. Huitink would have 
the ordering source consist solely of the salient goal of getting to Harlem ; the 
designated goal analysi s of vF&I would promote that goal by adding the 
proposition that you get to Harlem to the modal base; their nested modals analysi s 
would yield an ordering source (for the lower modal) consisting of just the 
proposition that you get to Harlem. In all of these cases, i t ' s  easy to satisfy the 
truth conditions of (40). 
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(4 1 )  What Huitink needs to say: 
' I f WANf P. CAN q' is true in w iff 3w' E MAX{p}(n.f(w» : q(w ') = 1 .  
-+ (40) i s  true i n  w iff at least one of the best (=Harlem) worlds in .f(w) is 
such that you kiss Pedro Martinez. 
(42) What vF&I need to say (similarly, Penka et al.) : 
'(lfwant p) Top. CAN q' is true in w iff 3w'EMAXg(wln.f(w)Up): q(w ')=l .  
-+ (40) is  true in w iff at least one of the g(w)-best get-to-Harlem worlds 
in .f(w) is such that you kiss Pedro Martinez. 
(43) What the vF&I nested modals analysis would need to say: 
' <MuST> if want p. CAN q' is true in w iff Vw' E n.f(w)Up: 
[3w"EMAXg(w.)(n.f(w'» : q(w ") = 1 ] . 
-+ (40) is true in w iff for all of the epistemicaJl y  accessible worlds w'  
such that your goal is  to get to Harlem, at least one o f  the g(w ' )-best 
(=Harlem) worlds is such that you kiss Pedro Martinez. 
Under those conditions, (40) is surely true; it  hard to imagine a reason why there 
wouldn 't  be an accessible world in which your goal of getting to Harlem is 
reached and you also kiss Pedro Martinez, given that he ' s  on the very train that 
takes you where you want to go. 
Note that (44a, b) are felici tous under the same circumstances- i f  it the 
case (and it i s) that both the A and the C trains will take you to Harlem. 
(44) a. If you want to get to Harlem, you can take the A train. 
b. Y ou can take the A train in order to get to Harlem . 
These sentences are understood to mean taking the A train is one way to achieve 
the goal of getting to Harlem- that that action constitutes a sufficient condition 
( together with facts in the circumstantial modal base) for achieving the goal . 
This observation is important, since it shows that one cannot simply 
stipulate that the anankastic reading is limited to modal operators with universal 
force. Existentials can in principle get ' anankastic-like '  (eparkastic) readi ngs. 
What is  needed i s  a theory that predicts (44) to be true while also 
predicting the Pedro Martinez sentence (40) to be false. 
5. A Suggestion 
I would l ike to suggest an approach to the problem of sufficiency conditionals that 
appropriates a core part of vF&I ' s  'designated goal ' theory, but rejects one of i ts 
i mportant details.  S pecifically,  we might accept vF&I ' s  insight that infiniti val to­
clauses are always what's  responsible for inducing the rel evant reading- while 
dispensing with their assumption that i t  restricts a modal operator. A fter al l ,  
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infini tival to-clauses can appear with ordinary VPs that aren ' t  in the scope of a 
modal . And when they do, they sti l l  typical ly express something about the goal s 
of the VP's agent. 
5.1 . Rationale Clauses in Non-Modal Environments 
I nfinitival to-clauses can appear in the environment of non-modal main clauses, 
where they nevertheless have a teleological interpretation: 
(45) Varitek took the A train to get to Harlem. 
(46) Menino went to the pub regularly to become mayor. 
(47) Satsuki 's  father drank green tea in order to remain healthy. 
(48) Rogers and Astaire practiced every day in order to dance professional ly. 
Rationale clauses themselves are interpreted as modal expressions, ordinarily 
descri bing the desires, aims and intentions of  agents. For i nstance, (45) implies 
that Varitek's goal in taking the A train was to get to Harlem ; he must have 
believed it to be either a necessary or sufficient condition for getting there, given 
other relevant facts about the world. And non-agentive VPs typically sound odd 
with rationale clauses- they are coerced into agentive readings: 
(49) # Those leaves turned colors in order to be attractive. 
(50) # Brad was bleeding in order to prove a point. 
Thus, ordinary agentive VPs are understood teleological ly: they describe goal­
directed actions. Rationale clauses serve to describe the goals that direct those 
actions. 
I think that what we should learn from such sentences is  that a crucial 
component of anankastic readings- specifically, the expression of an agent's goal 
in undertaking an action - i s  supplied internal to the VP. independent of an 
embedding modal verb. 
Here is a way of implementing the idea compositionally.  This method 
assumes that both VPS and rationale clauses denote predicates of events, and 
compose by Predicate Modification. Alternative assumptions could undoubtedly 
be made (e.g.  that the verb takes the rationale clause as an argument, or that the 
rationale clause takes the VP as its argument): I don't  think anything I have to say 
about these VPs hinges on any of these choices. 
(5 1 ) Denotations for VPs and rationale clauses 
a. II VP Varitek take the A train I I a.w = 
"-e. [event(e) & taking-the-A-train(e)(w) & Agent(e)(Varitek)] 
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b. I I  adjunct ( in order) to go to Harlem l I a.w = 
A.e.Vw '[w ' is compatible with the goals relevant to e: PRO goes to 
Harlem at w '] 
According to (5Ia) ,  the VP in (45) just denotes the predicate that is true of any A­
train-taking event in w whose agent is Varitek. 
As for the adjunct's denotation (SIb),  there are two things to note. First, it  
i s  a more or less standard (modulo the difference noted in  the next paragraph) 
description of a desire modeled after Hintikka' s  semantics for propositional 
attitudes (Hintikka 1969, von Fintel & Heim 2(05) . The facts above (45-50), I 
think, lead us to the conclusion that to-clauses, at least in this environment, are 
modal statements and not bare propositions. Assuming that all infinitival to­
adjuncts receive a unified treatment, this  observation is incompatible with the 
claim (made, for example, by vF&I) that an infinitival clause [to p] can serve to 
add the proposi tion that p (compositionally) to the modal base of a modal 
operator. Rather, adding [to p] to a modal base would be equivalent to adding the 
proposition [ . . . want that pV 
Second, the goal described by a rationale clause is stated relative to the 
lambda-abstracted event, on a par with the way modal accessibility is defined in 
relation to an evaluation world. This requires that we take event and world 
variables to be of the same essential type. Goals can be relevant to a possible 
world w, for instance the goals expressed by propositions that are assigned to w by 
the ordering source of a modal verb. The goals described in (S I b) as being 
"relevant to e", where e is  an agentive event, are simply the goals held by the 
agent of e that are relevant to carrying out the action that describes e. I don 't  think 
this is adding anything significant beyond what must be implicitly assumed about 
the notion agentivity. 
Closure over the conjunction of (5Ia) and (SIb) yields true (given an 
assignment a and world w) iff Varitek is the agent of an A-train-taking event e in  
w whose goal is  that he goes to  Harlem.s 
5.2. Teleological VPs and Necessity Conditionals 
I f  ordinary agentive VPs have teleological meanings, then the teleological 
component of an Anankastic Conditional 's  meaning doesn 't need to be specified 
by an argument of the modal .9 In (52a), the rationale clause modifies the VP, and 
is within the scope of the modal : 
(52) a. HA VE-TO j(w) g(w) [you take the A train in order to get to Harlem] 
b. True iff, in  all of the g(w)-best worlds in j(w), you are the agent of an 
A -train-taking event e whose goal is  that you go to Harlem. 
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When J(w) is a circumstantial modal base and g(w) is a bouletic ordering source 
that picks out your goals in w, the interpretation of (52a) will be anankastic. The 
goal expressed by the rationale-:elause- because it is in  the scope of the modal ­
is a goal held in worlds quantified over by the modal . But since the modal base i s  
circumstantial , relevant facts about w will be  true of  the quantified-over worlds as 
wel l ,  including (presumably;  see note 12) the fact that your goal is to go to 
Harlem; 
Let's  assume, following vF&I , that in conditionals with an ifclause and 
no overt rationale clause, the ifclause restricts the modal base and the rationale 
clause is elliptical : 
(53) a. If you want to go to Harlem, HAVE-TO f(w) g(w) [you take the A 
train (in  order to go there)] 
b. True iff, in all of the g(w)- best worlds in f(w) where you want to go to 
Harlem, you are the agent of an A-train-taking event e whose goal is  
that you go there. 
Truth conditions like these sti ll make wrong predictions in scenarios with 
additional goals (like Kratzer' s  mayor scenario, or Huitink's Ruud scenario)-if 
the ordering source g(w) necessari ly picks out all of your goals in w, the world of 
evaluation. For instance, if one of your goals in w is 'that you don 't take the A 
train ' ,  then it won't be the case that all of the g(w)-best worlds are A-train worlds. 
So the sentence corresponding to (53) would be predicted, wrongly, to be false in  
that scenario. 10 
To make the right predictions then, the VP-level analysis for the to-clause 
in anankastic sentences sti ll requires a supplementary assumption to block 
interfering goals from the ordering source. As far as I can see, there are two viable 
proposals to choose from: Huitink's  salient goals, and vF&I ' s  nested modals. l 1  I t  
would be  quite straightforward to supplement the VP-level analysis (52, 53) with 
Huitink's  proposal . We would only need to assume that it is (ultimately) the VP­
adjoined rationale clause- not the if-clause- that makes the goal salient. That 
would reduce g(w) to the single proposition that you go to Harlem. The nested 
modals idea would work equally well .  Then, for example,  (53 a) would be 
modified to (54a), yielding the truth conditions stated in (54b): 
(54) a. [<MUST> J(w) if you want to go to Harlem] [HAVE-TO J(w ') g(w ') 
[you take the A train in w' (in order to go there)]]  
b. True iff, in al l of the epistemically accessible worlds w ' in  which what 
you want is to go to Harlem: all the w '-best worlds that are 
circumstantially accessible from w '  are such that you are the agent of 
an A-train-taking event e whose goal is that you go there. 
That seems to get the truth conditions of Anankastics right. 1 2  
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To sum up what I think I 've shown so far in this section, to-clauses can 
appear as VP-adjuncts in non-modal environments. The right semantics for to­
clauses treats them as modal propositions describing goals ;  consequently,  the 
teleological component of anankastics comes from the scope of the modal rather 
than its restriction. I concluded with the observation that the goal nevertheless 
needs to appear in the modal restriction. This observation makes my V P-Ievel 
suggestion seem superfluous. In the next subsection I ' ll argue that i t 's  necessary 
after all ,  since it offers a way around the problem of kissing Pedro Martinez. 
5.3. The Teleological Nature oj VPs Solves the 'SUfficiency Conditional'  Problem 
What about the Pedro Martinez problem? The claim that modal verbs take 
teleological ly interpreted VPs allows a solution for it. Recall that the problem was 
to predict (44) to be true and (40) to be false: 
(44) If you want to get to Harlem,  you can take the A train .  
(40) #If you want to get to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. 
Suppose, as argued in the previous subsection, that the goal expressed in the 
rationale-clause projects up to the ordering source for the modal . Then, if the 
possibi l i ty modal contains an elliptical to-clause in its scope, interpreted as a 
description of the goal of the agentive VP, exactly these predictions are made: 
(55) Truth conditions for (44) : 
a. I f  you want to go to Harlem, CAN f(w) g(w) [you take the A train (in 
order to go there)] 
b. True iff, in al l of the g(w)-best worlds inf(w) where you want to go to 
Harlem, you are the agent of an A-train-taking event e whose goal is 
that you go there. (TRUE) 
(56) Truth conditions for (40) : 
a. I f you want to go to Harlem, CAN f(w) g(w) [you kiss Pedro Martinez 
(i n  order to go there)] 
b. True iff, in at least one of the g(w)-best worlds inf(w) where you want 
to go to Harlem, you are the agent of a Pedro-Martinez-kissing event 
e whose goal is that you go there. (FALSE) 
I t  is  plain that the deviance of (40) results from the deviance of (57), which 
remains deviant when embedded under can: 
(57) #1 kissed Pedro Martinez in order to go to Harlem. 
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6. Some Problems, and Tentative Remarks About How to Approach Them 
6.1 .  The Pedro Martinez Problem Might be Pragmatic 
lanneke Huitink (2005b, and p.c.) points out that the Pedro Martinez problem 
may be a more general problem for any existential conditional . The problem with 
Pedro Martinez sentences l ike (40a), Huitink speculates, is that "the antecedent 
and the consequent are unrelated, and therefore it is strange that there should be a 
conditional relation between them." She equates my example with others l ike: 
(58) If the Democrats win, the butler may have committed the murder. 
and states that "the problem of unrelated antecedents and consequents is not a 
semantic problem but a pragmatic one", which should be solved by means of a 
felicity condition on if-clauses: namely that "conditionals have to be i nformative". 
I ful l y  agree with Huitink's suggestion that there must be a felicity 
condition on the use of if-clauses, which affects existential condi tionals .  However, 
I think the problem can be further pinpointed: i t 's  not just that "conditionals have 
to be informative", rather, that "if-clauses must not be superfluous." Huitink 
demonstrates the superfluousness of the if-clause in (58) by noting that the 
sentence remains true if the main clause is negated. 
Note, however, that in Pedro Martinez sentences ,  it is not the if-clause that 
is superfluous- i t  is the main clause. In an 'existential anankastic '  (or eparkastic) 
the if-clause expresses the desired goal. What makes (40) false, intuitively, is that 
the action descri be by the main clause (kissing Pedro) i s  i rrelevant for achieving 
the goal . A fel ici ty condition demanding non-superfluous if-clauses would suffice 
for other non-anankastic existential conditionals. Pedro sentences seem to fall 
under a different generalization. Moreover, Huitink' s  felicity condition doesn ' t  
explain why the rationale-clause paraphrase (40b) is  l ikewise false, since that is  
not a condi tional . There too, the main clause seems responsible. 
(40) b. # In order to go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. 
6.2. Non-Agentive VPs 
Kai von Fintel (p.c .)  has pointed out a different problem , one which leads to the 
concl usion that infini tival to-clauses, at least sometimes, are not parsed as VP­
modifiers in the scope of modals. Consider the two sentences of (59). These both 
receive anankastic interpretations: they express a necessary condition (knowing 
French) for achieving an outcome (working in the public schools) . 
(59) a.  Y ou have to know French if you want to work in the public school s. 
b .  Y ou have to know French in order to work in the public  schools. 
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Unlike the sentences considered throughout this paper, however, the VP of the 
main clause is not agentive: it describes the (non-voli tional) state of knowing 
French. Consequently, it cannot be modified by a purposive to-clause: 
(60) #Jean knows French in order to get a job in the public schools.  
I f  anankastic readings were always derived in the manner suggested in  section 5, 
then the VPs in (59) would have to be in all relevant respects identical to (60)­
predicting both (59a-b) to be deviant as wel l ,  wrongly. That is, by the logic of 
section 5, the deviance of (60) should lead to the deviance of (59). The to-clause 
in (59b) seems not to have an available parse as a VP-modifier. 
I argued at the end of section 5.2, however, that my VP-level analysis is  
compatible with, but  not necessary for anankastic readings with universal modal 
operators. The VP-level analysis is necessary when the modal is existential (as I 
argued in sections 4 and 5.3) . And interestingly, when the universal modals in 
non-agentive environments l ike (59) are replaced by existentials (60), the relevant 
readings disappear. This looks very much like support for the claim that the VP­
level analysis is crucial for existential versions of anankastic sentences.  
(6 1 )  a .  #You can know French if you want to work in the public schools .  
b. #You can know French in order to work in the public schools. 
What about the interpretations of (59a, b)? With regard to the anankastic 
conditional (59a) , the two options I suggested at the end of section 5.2 (or the 
third one that I suggested in note 12) allow for a straightforward interpretation 
without a VP-Ievel to-clause. As for (59b), the only tenable attachment site for the 
to-clause is evidently at the level of the modal verb, raising the obvious question 
whether the modal semantics I gave for to-clauses in section 5. 1 will work (or 
whether Bech 1957 was right in claiming that anankastic to-clauses differ from 
rationale clauses) . As far as I can see, my modal version of to-clauses (5 1b) 
works well for (59b) , if the modal proposition is added to the modal base 
( indirectly providing a goal for the ordering source). Roughly, the sentence would 
be true in w iff, in all of the g(w)- best worlds among those in which the relevant 
goal is that you work in the public schools, you know French. 
Endnotes 
* I stumbled onto this topic while undertaking a project on the syntax and 
semantics of rationale clauses. l owe a big debt of grati tude to Kai von Fintel and 
Sabine Iatridou, Janneke Huitink, and Arnim von Stechow and hi s colleagues, 
who by sharing their work in progress (which I got to via Kai 's weblog) made it 
possible for an onlooker l ike me to benefit from and take part in  the public 
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discussion they were having. In addition, Kai von Finte! , lanneke Huitink, Alan 
Bale, Yosef Grodzinsky, and Martin Hackl provided extremely helpful comments 
and criticisms at various stages. I also wish to thank the other participants at the 
SALT conference. This work was supported by the Fonds Quebecois de l a  
Recherche sur la Societe et la Culture, award # 99440. 
IActually, this is  not quite right. It is  more accurate to say that ( l Oa) is equivalent 
to the statement "If q and other relevant facts about the world hold, then p". See 
section 2 for a more thorough description and justification of this qual ification. I 
thank Kai von Fintel (p.c.) for calling this to my attention. 
2 As vF&1 hint in their paper, it  would work just as well to treat the to-clause as an 
adjunct that restricts the modal base rather than an extra argument of the modal . 
3vF&1 argue for a distinction between have to/must, on the one hand, and ought 
to/should on the other. For have to/must, they give an interesting argument that the 
ordering source effectively plays no role-i.e. the proposition in the scope of 
w ant in the if-clause i s  required to hold in all the worlds quantified over by the 
modal, regardless of any other desires, etc . that are held in the evaluation world. 
4Von Stechow et al. (2005) independently propose this idea but take i t  in a 
different direction: they propose the to-clause restricts the modal base of 
something like a counterfactual conditional . For discussion see Huitink (2005b). 
SBut see section 5 . 1 for an argument that thi s  wouldn' t  actually be compositional . 
6Given the distinction mentioned in note 3, Huitink's  observation applies just to 
anankastics with ought/should under their theory. 
7Perhaps it is not obvious that we want a unified treatment for to-adjuncts, 
however. See Bech ( 1 957) for an argument that to-clauses come in two flavors. I 
will proceed under the assumption that a unified treatment i s  desirable, if possible. 
In section 6.2 I give a sketch of an argument that i t  i s .  
8 1  assume the open event argument i s  existentially closed and that modal verbs 
compose with an intensional abstraction over the VP's denotation. 
90r, more generally, by an additional restriction on the modal base. See note 2. 
1 01 am grateful to Kai von Fintel for noticing thi s and pointing it out to me. 
l iThe 'designated goal' fix advocated by vF&I -adding the bare proposition that 
you go to Harlem to the modal base- isn't a viable option if the elliptical to­
phrase is actuall y  a modal statement, as I argued in the previous subsection. 
121 believe there might actually be a third, more parsimonious option for 
eliminating the problem of interfering goals, which may not have been brought up 
so far. Let' s accept that every proposition p in an ordering source g(w) has a 
corresponding proposition in a circumstantial modal base ordered by g(w) : e :g . 
that "the laws ofw demand that p ", "One of Sue 's goals in w is that p ", etc. (Such 
descriptions of the propositions in the ordering source surely count as ' relevant 
facts about w. ' )  Let' s assume further that an if-clause like "if you want p "  can add 
to the modal base the hypothetical proposition that 'what you want in w is that p '. 
Since the propositions in a circumstantial modal base must be consi stent, adding 
such a proposi tion entail s that the modal base doesn' t  contain descriptions  of any 
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other desires of yours i n  w .  That in tum entails  that the ordering source (if it picks 
out what you desire in w) contains only p. If thi s reasoning i s  correct, then there i s  
no mayor problem (or Ruud problem): anankastic conditionals simply add the if­
clause to the modal base, and the option of limiting the ordering source to the 
corresponding singleton proposition follows. 
I think this option is attractive. I 'm not sure if it' s really distinct from 
Hui tink ' s salient goal theory, although I stated it somewhat differently .  
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